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## 2024/25 Gas Incentive Performance

### **Quarterly Report**

**October – December 2024** 



#### Introduction

This report is to provide a quarterly overview of the National Gas Transmission (NGT) incentives. It was produced following feedback received through responses to industry events. It should be read in conjunction with the annual RIIO-2 System Operator Incentives supporting information published on our website in October each year which provides a summary of our annual financial performance and further incentive scheme details. The Gas System Operator (GSO) function of NGT is subject to licence obligations and several financial and reputational incentive arrangements, which are measured in accordance with the licence following consultation<sup>1</sup>.

These incentive arrangements are designed to minimise the overall cost of system operation leading to benefit for consumers, they are designed to influence our behaviour to minimise the impact on the market, to consider environmental impacts and to support the efficient operation of the wholesale gas market.

The various incentive schemes provide a focus on key areas where NGT can create value for the industry and consumers, the financial schemes allow NGT to retain a share of any value created or be penalised should targets not be met.

#### For further details

Further details on each incentive see: https://www.nationalgas.com/about-us/system-operator-incentives

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<sup>1</sup> Special Condition 5.6 System operator external incentives, revenues, and costs (SOIRCt)

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2024/25 Performance based upon actuals from  $1^{\text{st}}$  October 2024 to  $31^{\text{st}}$  December 2024.

Financial Incentives – Performance Scorecard

Incentive	Purpose	Cap and Collar	2024/25 Licence Benchmark	What has influenced performance this year
Capacity Constraint Management	To incentivise the maximum release of capacity (above our obligations) and minimise the costs of constraints against a set financial cost target.	+£5.2m to -£5.2m	A net cost target of £8.5m for entry and exit operational constraint management - incentive revenue or penalty is 39% of the over or under spend respectively with the remaining 61% being passed back to Shippers. NGT retain 14% of non-obligated capacity (entry and exit) sales under the incentive.	No constraint actions during the quarter, risk has been managed with operational tools, planning and strategy. Higher levels of entry non – obligated capacity have been released, due to increased customer requests.
Demand Forecasting D-1	Deliver accurate 13:00 day ahead demand forecast.	+£1.5m to -£1.5m	The scheme has a target forecast error of 8.35mcm per day adjusted up to a further 1mcm dependent upon the extent of additional short cycle storage injection capability connected to the NTS.	Average daily error of 8.14mcm during this quarter. To date, DFSA is forecast to be 0.0mcm as injection capability has been lower than last year and seven out of eight sites have met the requirement to be included, by injecting and withdrawing on the same day. Underlying demand levels for Q3 24/25 are lower this year (226mcm/day) compared to the same period last year (231mcm/day) due to reduced EU export.
Residual Balancing	To balance supply and demand on the gas day minimising the impact our trading has on the market when we do take action to balance the network.	+£1.6m to -£2.8m	Linepack Performance Measure (LPM) Target: 2.8mcm/d change. For the shoulder months (October, November, February, and March) there is an increase in the target where there is in effect a neutral position between 2.8 and 5.6 mcm/d. Price Performance Measure (PPM) Target: 1.5% of System Average Price (SAP).	LPM: The average daily linepack change was 1.7mcm compared to the 2.8mcm target. PPM: The average price spread for residual balancing trades was 0.5% of SAP compared to the 1.5% target. Traded on 57 days out of 92 (65% days) On the commodity market (OCM) SAP (System Average Price) ranged from 94.0 p/th (on 01.10.2024) to 122.3 p/th (on 28.12.2024)
Maintenance	Deliver benchmark performance for summer maintenance outage days, including and excluding Valve Operations (VO). Minimise NGT driven changes to maintenance planning to deliver network access for customers	+£0.5m to -£1.5m.	<ul> <li>Maintenance Period covers 1<sup>st</sup> Apr – 31<sup>st</sup> October.</li> <li>1. Changes – minimisation of changes initiated by NGT – Target 7.25% of the total maintenance plan days in the year.</li> <li>2. Use of Days – (VO) – Target 11 days.</li> <li>3. Use of Days – (ex VO) – Target align 75% of customer impacting.</li> </ul>	At the end of Q3, the Summer 24 maintenance outage plan delivered 273 days of customer impacting work. Zero maintenance day was issued. This includes use of days for both VOs and non-VOs works 100% of aligned summer maintenance was completed by the end of October, with 10 change days initiated by NGT.
Greenhouse Gas Emissions	To consider the environmental impact of our compressor operations when venting	+£1.5m to -£1.5m	Minimise emissions from compressors with a breakeven target of 2,897 tonnes. Emissions venting reference price for this incentive year is £2,635/tonne.	A total of 636 tonnes of natural gas were vented during the quarter. Since April approximately 48% of the annual target has been used. As demand increases, focus shifts from summer processes such as engine inhibiting to winter assurance and ensuring efficiency in operating units

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